What is normal is teenagers doing stupid things. What is normal is young people making mistakes."
1 The president's El Reno trip was intended to build support for a significant shift in federal policy: reduction or elimination of mandatory minimum sentences, alternative sanctions for nonviolent offenders, restoration of voting rights to former prisoners, and "ban the box" rules to discourage employers from asking job candidates about their criminal records. The president's visit and his proposed reforms illustrate a departure from a dominant leadership paradigm in the United States, aptly characterized by Jonathan Simon as "governing through crime." 2 For over a generation few political costs were paid and many benefits reaped by elected officials for increasing sentences, ignoring racial disparities, and indeed considering mass incarceration to be "normal."
President Obama's attempt to bring criminal justice into public view, to begin a dialogue on how to punish better and more fairly, is in itself a significant change in the political culture.
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The president's prison visit is a further sign that over recent years, in the wake of the crime drop and falling levels of public concern with and attention to crime, the seemingly inexorable upsurge in US imprisonment is slowing down, or being sent into reverse. 4 The recent publication and discussion of high-profile reports on the problems of mass incarceration and police racism and brutality are also indicators that the terms of debate about crime and justice may be shifting. 5 It is no doubt too early to tell to what extent, or how durably, the penal climate is altering and to know whether recent reversals signify a material change (in that climate), or simply a reversible fluctuation (in the penal weather). It would certainly be naïve to rely on simple optimism that things are taking a turn for the better, to assume that state austerity will alone be sufficient to produce significant penal change, or to underestimate the reach and embeddedness of the American carceral state. 6 In this regard, we should recall something else that makes the El Reno trip remarkable: Obama was the first sitting president to visit a federal prison, the first leader of America's democracy to visit the unfree world that has been constructed in that democracy's midst. What had been keeping these powerful men away for so long from the disempowered and disenfranchised? What was so repellent about the institutions over which the president has ultimate oversight? Why did it take the intolerable financial burden of massive public spending on incarceration at a time of deep economic recession to push criminal justice, slowly and hesitantly at first, on to state and federal executives' agendas? In this introductory chapter we want to outline and develop the core idea that animates this volume: namely, that one underexploited resource for a better penal politics lies in investigating the ideals and institutions of democracy and thinking about how these ideals can be theorized and given practical effect in reshaping the criminal justice and penal arrangements of advanced capitalist democracies today.
The Long Shadow of Mass Incarceration
Over the last thirty years mass incarceration (especially in the United States) came to seem inexorable and unremitting. This was so not just in terms of chronically high levels of imprisonment. It was also registered in terms of massive racial disproportion and the demotic symbolic politics that made "the prison" appear a necessary, obvious, commonsense solution to problems of crime and violence. But the more immovable mass imprisonment came to seem, the more it imposed a block on our capacity to imagine alternatives to it. The major and urgent task became that of tracing the contours of this phenomenon and grasping its social, institutional, economic, and cultural impact.
The long shadow cast by mass incarceration over penal scholarship has generated much original work on this phenomenon and its wider consequences. We consequently now know a great deal about the structural causes of this phenomenon and about the political dynamics that have fueled and shaped it. 8 Of late, rather more sustained attention has been devoted to examining the effects of mass incarceration, not only in terms of its impact on crime, 9 but also in respect of how it has reshaped other institutions of American society from the economy, to families, to communities, to the political process. 10 This has been important work. But beneath the shadow cast by penal excess it is also possible to discern certain temptations and attendant pathologies that have informed both analyses of mass imprisonment and prescriptions for how best to respond to it. Our judgment is that these pathologies have become an impediment to our capacity to think not just about, but also beyond, mass incarceration.
Common among them, we suggest, has been nostalgia: a lament for a better and lost world in which welfare liberal social policies were ascendant, where these coincided with (or helped produce) imprisonment rates that were lower and more stable, and where the climate of social and penal policymaking was much "cooler" and more rational. As we have noted elsewhere, this lamentation for mid-twentieth-century welfare liberalism (or in European terms, social democracy) is often accompanied by the miserabalist premise that what gets bad is going to get worse. 11 In terms of intervention, the heatingup of the penal climate over recent decades has given rise to a situation in which countervoices of social science have tended to eschew spaces of public engagement for fear of being trashed by a febrile media, as well as adopting a certain defensiveness in the diagnosis of what is to be done. The result is that penal politics has come to be seen as a rear-guard action where the principal objective is damage limitation or the protection of the hard-won and fragile gains of the past.
Two points might usefully be made about these structuring orientations toward mass incarceration. The first is to ask why lament and defensiveness has become so prevalent in the social analysis of, and responses to, penal excess. One answer is that mass imprisonment has played to criminology's self-image (and, we should add, its strengths) as a "dismal science." Our most powerful and compelling stories of penal change are narratives of decline and disaster. They have variously documented, warned, alerted, and critiqued. In the process the field has spun or imported (and sometimes loosely deployed or overextended) certain now-familiar concepts-risk, populism, punitiveness, and neoliberalism being obvious cases in point. But the social analysis of punishment has much less frequently speculated, reconstituted, or imagined alternatives to the penal disasters that it describes or denounces.
The second is to bring more clearly into view one alternative world that is to be found (sometimes expressly, often implicitly) in dominant accounts of mass imprisonment. What holds these responses to mass incarceration together, we think, is an outlook that one might call penal elitism. This is the worldview which holds that so long as experts-government officials, justice professionals, lawyers, researchers, and so onare given the predominant say over the shape of penal policies, or else reinstated to a position of dominance, better penal outcomes will follow-where "better" means something along the lines of more moderate, milder, rights-respecting, liberal, or principled. The flip-side of this warm embrace of expertise has been a certain "discomfort with democracy": 12 a fear of permitting the demos too great an influence over penal policy and a concern that too intimate a connection between the public and policymakers will lead to immoderately punitive measures. This discomfort with democratic practice (and the resultant tendency to neglect democratic theory) 13 has been one of the most striking analytic effects generated by the three decade long penal upsurge. It has come close to acquiring the status of orthodoxy among analysts and critics of mass incarceration-one that has made a return to insulated professionalism and technocratic governance seem an obvious antidote to "hot" issues such as criminal justice. Protecting punishment from democracy has, in short, become the default answer to the question of what we can reasonably hope for in penal politics. So much so that the problematic that animates and organizes this book may (initially) strike readers as counterintuitive, even decidedly odd.
Distrust of the public has first and foremost shaped thinking on how to explain the rise of mass imprisonment-and the "exceptional" character of penal regimes in the United States. Reflected in scholarship on so-called penal populism, but also in the dayto-day assumptions of politicians and sitting government officials, looms an image of the punitive public demanding tough sentences and resistant to progressive reform. This, the argument runs, has been coupled with "the radically extensive and extraordinarily decentralized quality of US democracy" 14 -porous state and local political systems that have given way to democratic pressures of uninformed electorates and frenzied media responses to dramatic criminal events. 15 The ability of penal bureaucrats to manage or fend off these pressures is, conversely, posited as the principal explanation for the relative mildness of punishment in Scandinavia and parts of Western Europe. 16 By extension, keeping the public at bay has become a central plank of several influential accounts of how to temper punitive excesses. Here the claim is that the only way to scale back imprisonment is to insulate criminal justice policy through more backroom decisions, more expert interventions in sentencing commissions, and fewer grandstands offered to politicians seeking office on the back of tough-on-crime promises. The attendant ambition is to defend existing institutions of mediation between public demands and penal outcomes (such as parole boards) or to create new expert authorities, operating at one remove from direct political pressure, in and through which rational penal policy can be formed. 17 Such technocratic solutions have also loomed large in recent governmental thinking about how to navigate a route away from mass incarceration. Even as the current administration began to draw mass incarceration into focus as a policy problem, highranking officials continued to block broader critical thinking on the issue as a public problem. In 2013, at the beginning of the policy shift, US Attorney General Eric Holder, the nation's most visible criminal justice professional, proclaimed that his colleagues needed to be "smarter on crime," meaning more sensible about sentencing for nonviolent or low-level offenses and more conscious of the racial biases of current practice.
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Though Holder applauded the professionalism of his colleagues standing at the gateway to prison-the police, attorneys, prosecutors, judges, wardens, probation officers-his "smarter on crime" remarks implied that status-quo tough sentences and racial bias do not lead to safer streets; they are "dumb." At a time when leading scholars increasingly see criminal justice as "the most dysfunctional of the major institutional accomplishments of the Enlightenment," 19 Holder's framework suggests that the way forward is a return to Enlightenment rationality (rather than an immanent critique of it) to become more sophisticated criminal justice experts and professionals. Being smart on crime, on this view, means listening to the experts more and the electorate less.
Penal Politics and Democratic Hope
This volume takes issue with technocratic discourse and the attendant suspicion of the public-and its participation in political life-that is at its root. It is not entirely correct to say, as President Obama did, that "we," meaning "the public," think mass incarceration is normal. It may be more precise to say that we the public have not been provided many opportunities to think seriously about mass incarceration at all. Crime and punishment saturate news and entertainment media, to be sure. But we actually don't engage in much concerted public discourse about the process or the practices our taxes support. Indeed, The aim of this volume is to connect debate about the future of punishment to a wider conversation about ideals and institutions of democracy. We want to encourage research and reflection on the mutually corrosive relationship that occurs, but also on the mutually supportive associations that may be fostered, between penal practices and democracy. In so doing, our aim is to treat democratic values and commitments as an underexploited "resource of hope" for building a better-by which we mean more deliberative and inclusive-penal politics. 20 We want to suggest three main ways in which a productive interplay between punishment and democratic theory is being developed.
A first line of analysis seeks to extend the critique of mass incarceration by situating it within the frame of democratic ideals and practice, thereby extending and recasting our analysis of what is at stake in penal policy and politics. Much of the empirical research on American punishment in recent years has focused on the impact of political systems on punishment-whether in terms of the advent of governing through crime, 23 the rise of symbolic and populist political forms, 24 the incentive and opportunity structures created (or blocked) by different political arrangements, 25 or the mobilization of social movements in the penal field. 26 But thinking about punishment through the lens of democracy also calls for analyses of the impact of mass incarceration upon democratic politics. 27 To think democratically-rather than simply in crime control terms-about punishment is not just to revisit longstanding questions about the claims of retribution, deterrence, or rehabilitation as penal aims, or about the grounding of the sovereign right to punish in general. Rather, in our current contexts, it is also to seek to ask sharper A second-in some respects more established and well-trodden-path entails finding within penal and political theory arguments for restraining the reach of the penal state, whether via desert theory, penal communication, or republicanism. Democratic theory has, arguably, been an underutilized resource in such normative thinking about justifying and limiting the scope of state punishment. It is a field that might usefully be mined further in order to make the numerous sage recommendations for penal moderation or parsimony more compelling and better grounded-and we and others have recently intimated that the concepts of legitimacy and citizenship might prove to be useful meeting grounds for extending that conversation. 29 In our view, such an extension of penal theory offers grounds for questioning the democratic credentials of a society that punishes its citizens in the way that the American polity currently does. Quite a few criminologists in the United States and elsewhere have taken steps in these directions, 32 sometimes in alliance with progressive administrators and practitioners, and those parties need to be both supported and challenged by democratic theory.
A third point of connection is to be found in the use of democratic theory as a resource for exploring strategies of penal reform and for more broadly reconstructing how democratic societies might respond to crime. This has been a lively but still nascent theme with a small body of literature on deliberative democracy and punishment. Work here has largely developed as a response to, and critique of, the orthodoxy of insulating criminal justice from political control. It has sought instead to explore the unfulfilled promise of the ideal of greater democratic participation in crime control, and to bring to notice and advance understanding of practical innovations that give effect to such public involvement, in respect of restorative justice, justice reinvestment, and beyond. 33 There remains a great deal more theoretical work to be done along these lines, not least in demonstrating that populism and technocracy are not the polarized ideologies they are typically assumed to be within criminology, but can be theorized instead as twin pathologies of our contemporary anti-political malaise, 34 both of which "disfigure" the ideal and practice of democratic government by neglecting the normative force of democratic procedures. 35 But there is also a rich agenda of research and theorizing entailed in furthering practices of "democratic experimentalism" in crime control and punishment 36 -that is to say, in fostering the development of, and learning lessons from, deliberative practices whose aim is to promote civic reintegration, emphasize mutual accountability for penal decisions, and foster proper recognition that those whom we punish are co-citizens. 37 In other words, we need greater reflection on what it would look like to impose sanctions without magnifying existing inequalities and in ways that maintain equality of concern and respect for all parties involved.
In our view, these points of intersection between democratic theory and penal practice offer a theoretically rich and politically promising agenda for thinking about punishment beyond mass incarceration. It is an agenda that focuses-via the three moments of critique, restraint, and reconstruction we have described-on the aims and 
Organization of this Volume
This collection of original chapters seeks to catalyze an engaged, multidisciplinary discussion among philosophers, political theorists, and theoretically inclined criminologists about how contemporary democratic theory might begin to think beyond mass incarceration. 38 Rather than viewing punishment as a natural reaction to crime and imprisonment as a sensible outgrowth of this reaction, we frame these as institutions with deep implications for contemporary civic identity and that present unmet demands for public oversight and reflective democratic influence. What conceptual resources can be deployed to support decarceration and alternatives to prison? How might democratic theory strengthen recent efforts in restorative justice and other reform movements? How can the normative complexity of criminal justice be grappled with by lay citizens rather than experts or officials-from street-level policing decisions, to adjudication, to prison and probation policy? How, in short, might modern publics forge a creative alternative to an unreflective commitment to mass incarceration? In reflecting on these questions, the authors investigate how to better situate the prison in the discourse of reform, offer conceptual guideposts for thinking about incarceration, critically examine the methods and uses of public opinion regarding punishment, and suggest ways of reconceiving crime control institutions to enhance rather than thwart citizen capabilities.
One explanation for the doxa surrounding the normalcy of mass incarceration, and a problem facing any attempt at a more critical public discourse for reform, is social geography. As Rebecca Thorpe's chapter forcefully points out, prisons are out of sight, out of mind, and highly ambiguous for many people. The rapid growth of prisons since the 1970s, especially in rural America, has provided jobs and revenues in impoverished communities. This kind of public investment is an economic dead end, however. As prison areas are rarely sites of further growth or development, it represents the shortsighted triumph of penal policy over more constructive approaches to rebuilding the poor, urban, and racially segregated neighborhoods disproportionately filling the rural prison cells.
How to orient our normative thinking about reform is the subject of the next three chapters. Reform efforts targeting contemporary penal institutions need to take their bearings from some overarching understanding of the purposes served by criminal justice. Antony Duff and Sandra Marshall draw attention to the ideal role of the criminal law in a democratic republic, understood as a political society made up of free and equal citizens.
Criminal law in such a society would be recognized by citizens to be something they shared and took part in as a common law. Focusing in particular on citizens convicted of crimes, they discuss the civic roles related to punishment that emerge in a democratic republic and how these roles, considered as a matter of ideal theory, reflect just how far current punishment practices are from widely embraced political ideals. uncovered less public support for "get tough" measures than traditional public opinion polling because they typically provide context and promote discussion of multiple viewpoints. While it is a mistake to think that such methods disclose "real" public opinion, they do ask people to foster defensible positions, alert them to issues they may not have contemplated, and help participants see their connections to others' lives.
Rebuilding crime control institutions that can both respect and enable the civic capacity of regular citizens is an uphill struggle. Chapters 11 to 13 take aim at exclusionary practices in the penal system, policymaking process, and in the legal Drawing attention to relatively unexplored links between democratic theory and the criminal law, Roberto Gargarella suggests that criminal trials, sentencing, and penal decision-making can become both more democratic and more deliberative. Trials can treat offenders as active contributors to a moral dialogue about harmful action and the law, not as passive subjects of condemnation, while sentencing and justice policymaking
can become more open to civil society. Rejecting both penal elitism and pure populism, a deliberative democratic approach to criminal justice seeks out ways of constructively welcoming citizen participation and action on criminal justice issues. Openness to public engagement, even when it takes the form of disruptive social protest, is needed to address the serious legitimacy problems facing the law in many countries.
This collection comes at an opportune moment when the onward march of mass incarceration has taken a pause, thus weakening the politically and intellectually convenient alibi of inevitability. Against this backdrop, the chapters in this volume offer an exciting agenda for theorization, empirical inquiry, and civic engagement. They present a new political mode of judgment and critique of actually existing penal practices, reminding us that criminal justice and punishment are always about more than just the regulation of crime. As the arguments presented in the pages that follow forcefully attest, issues of crime control are also inescapably entangled with the question of how to foster and sustain better democratic governance; the task that confronts us is not simply "downsizing the carceral state," but "strengthening the democratic state." 
